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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on an appeal by 
William C. Rand, a shareholder in CBS Corporation, the 
successor to Westinghouse Electric Corporation, from an 
order entered on October 19, 2000, awarding plaintiff 
Daniel Mogell attorney's fees of $582,443.44 out of the 
$750,000 requested in this derivative litigation upon its 
settlement. Rand objected in the district court to the award 
of any fee and, in the alternative, objected to the quantum 
of the fee requested.1 Rand repeats those two objections on 
this appeal. Inasmuch as we hold that the district court 
erred in awarding any fee, we do not consider whether the 
fee as awarded was excessive. 
 
We only need summarize the convoluted procedural 
history of this case. The appeal arises from the settlement 
of derivative litigation against Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation and its successor in interest, CBS Corporation, 
as well as certain of the corporations' directors and officers. 
As a matter of convenience, we will refer to the corporate 
defendants simply as CBS even though much of the alleged 
wrongdoing charged in the litigation took place before CBS 
succeeded to Westinghouse's interests. The derivative 
litigation was related to a shareholders' class action 
commenced in 1991 following CBS's announcement that it 
would incur multi-million dollar losses on account of 
certain loans it had made. The class action was based on 
alleged statutory securities and common law violations, 
while the derivative litigation was based on allegations that 
CBS's officers and directors grossly mismanaged CBS and 
had been reckless with respect to its affairs. There is no 
doubt that the prosecution and defense of both the class 




1. There were other objectors as well. 
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In 1998, after extensive pretrial proceedings, the class 
action parties reached a tentative settlement subject to 
court approval providing for a cash payment of 
$67,500,000 to the class action plaintiffs to be paid in large 
part by insurance companies pursuant to liability policies 
covering CBS's officers and directors. The settlement, 
however, required the termination of the derivative litigation 
because some of the insurance policies covered claims 
asserted in both the class action and derivative litigation 
and the companies were unwilling to pay the amount 
needed to settle the class action without receiving a release 
of their obligations in both sets of litigation. But the 
defendants in the derivative litigation were unwilling to 
provide those releases unless they, in turn, received a 
release of all claims asserted against them in that litigation. 
 
Ultimately, in 1999 the derivative litigation, like the class 
action litigation, was settled subject to court approval. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Mogell emphasized the relationship 
between the class action and derivative litigation to the 
district court in his application for approval of the 
derivative litigation settlement and allowance of fees as 
follows: 
 
       Accordingly, without the release of the defendants in 
       the Derivative Litigation, CBS cannot obtain the 
       substantial funds needed to `bridge the gap' to settle 
       the Class Action Litigation. Thus, by obtaining these 
       releases, which were a material component of the 
       conditions set down by the Carriers, CBS was relieved 
       of having to pay many millions more of the settlement 
       of the Class Action. Even more significantly, such 
       settlement, if approved by this Court, will relieve it of 
       many hundreds of millions of dollars of potential 
       liability exposure from the underlying claims asserted 
       in the Class Action. 
 
App. at 111-12. Mogell then went on to explain the need for 
the settlement of the derivative action as follows: 
 
       CBS also will not release the insurers who wrote those 
       director and officer insurance policies without a 
       simultaneous settlement of the Derivative Litigation 
       because CBS is financially obligated under bylaws 
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       adopted in accordance with Pennsylvania law to 
       indemnify the defendants in the Class Action and in 
       the Derivative Litigation for any liabilities and for all 
       defense costs that are not covered by insurance. Thus, 
       even if the defendants in the Derivative Litigation 
       would agree to release their insurers without a 
       settlement of the Derivative Litigation, CBS would not 
       agree to incur liabilities and defense costs in both the 
       Class Action and the Derivative Litigation that 
       otherwise would be covered by insurance. The release 
       of the defendants in the Derivative Litigation is, 
       therefore, an integral element of the settlement of the 
       Class Action, which can now be concluded with 
       approval by the Court. 
 
Id. at 112. 
 
Mogell then summed up what he thought was the benefit 
to CBS of a settlement of the derivative litigation as follows: 
 
       Settlement of the Class Action, which could not be 
       consummated without global releases from the 
       Carriers, directly benefits CBS because, as indicated 
       above, CBS is a defendant in that litigation, yet will not 
       be the principal source of funds for the litigation 
       settlement. Thus, settlement of the Derivative Litigation 
       permits CBS to be provided with many millions in 
       funds from the Carriers to conclude the Class Action, 
       which otherwise poses a substantial risk of liability in 
       the hundreds of millions of dollars to CBS if it were not 
       settled. In addition, settlement of the Derivative 
       Litigation relieves CBS of any obligation to indemnify 
       the defendants, a savings that cannot be readily 
       quantified, but which could well exceed many millions 
       of dollars. 
 
Id. at 112-13. 
 
The "Derivative Action Stipulation of Settlement" dated 
May 11, 1999, included a provision by which CBS was to 
receive certain benefits which included "$250,000 that 
otherwise would have been paid to settle the Class Action 
Litigation," to be paid by the insurance companies that had 
issued the officers' and directors' policies. Id. at 88. The 
stipulation also stated that CBS was to receive the benefit 
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that both the class action and derivative litigation would be 
ended. Mogell, however, did not assert in his application for 
approval of the settlement how the derivative litigation had 
benefitted CBS, focusing instead on the benefits of its 
termination. 
 
The stipulation in the derivative action provided that if 
the court approved the settlement, Mogell's attorney could 
submit an application for attorney's fees and 
reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $750,000 
divided between $631,000 in attorney's fees and $119,000 
for reimbursement of expenses. CBS took no position with 
respect to the allowance of the fees but agreed to pay any 
award up to $750,000. The granting of the fee application, 
however, was "not a condition of the Settlement," id. at 95, 
and was to be considered by the court separately from the 
court's consideration of whether the settlement"is fair, 
reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of CBS and 
the holders of shares of CBS common stock." Id. Of course, 
if the court denied the fee application, the settlement 
nevertheless was to stand. As could be expected, Mogell 
applied for the fees as the settlement contemplated. 
 
The district court approved the settlement of both the 
class action and derivative litigation on October 18, 1999. 
At that time, however, the court did not rule on Mogell's fee 
application. Instead, one year later on October 18, 2000, it 
issued a memorandum order entered on October 19, 2000, 
on the point. The memorandum recited that "[i]n this case, 
CBS Corporation, Westinghouse's successor, has derived a 
benefit from the disposition by settlement of the two new 
derivative claims and the ability to obtain a global 
settlement of the underlying securities action." Id. at 4. The 
court, however, did not indicate that CBS received a benefit 
from the institution of the derivative litigation, as 
distinguished from its settlement. The court, after 
determining that a fee should be awarded, addressed the 
quantum of the award, pointing out that Mogell's attorney 
submitted a lodestar computation of $1,456,108.60 for the 
value of the legal services. The court concluded, however, 
for reasons that we need not explain, that a 60% deduction 
was appropriate and thus it awarded $582,443.44 in fees. 
Rand then appealed from the order of October 19, 2000. 
 




The district court had jurisdiction in this action under 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Rand, as an objecting shareholder, has standing to 
appeal. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d 
Cir. 1993). In general, we review the award of a fee for an 
abuse of discretion, although there are clear error and 
plenary aspects in a review including examination of factual 
findings and legal conclusions. See Watson v. Southeastern 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 224 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S.Ct. 1086 (2001); Holmes v. Millcreek 
Township Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 589 (3d Cir. 2000). In 
this case, as will be seen, we hold that as a matter of law 
the district court erred in awarding any fee as the derivative 
litigation did not benefit CBS and thus we are exercising 
plenary review. We note, however, that if we were reviewing 
this matter on an abuse of discretion basis our result 
would be the same. 
 
It is useful at the outset of our discussion of the 
substantive issues to refer to and dispose of the four issues 
that Mogell in his brief indicates are raised on this appeal: 
 
       1. May an objector who does not object to the prop osed 
       settlement of a derivative action later be heard to object 
       to a fee award on the basis that the settlement did not 
       justify an award of attorneys fees and reimbursement 
       of expenses? 
 
       2. Whether the district court's finding that the 
       settlement conferred benefits upon CBS Corporation 
       was clearly erroneous? 
 
       3. May an objector who does not object to the lode star 
       of the derivative plaintiffs' counsel later be heard to 
       object to a fee award based upon the lodestar? 
 
       4. Whether the district court's determination that  the 
       lodestar of the derivative plaintiffs' counsel was 
       reasonable was within its discretion? 
 
Br. at 1. Consideration of these issues does not long detain 
us. 
 
First, the fact that Rand did not object to the settlement 
does not mean that he cannot object to the fee application. 
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The settlement of the derivative litigation was not 
dependent on the disposition of the fee application and the 
stipulation of settlement did not and probably could not 
provide that Mogell's attorney would be paid any fees 
without court approval. The settlement merely provided 
that Mogell's attorney could apply for fees to which CBS 
would not object if the application did not seek an award of 
over $750,000. Accordingly, Rand, by not objecting to the 
settlement, did not waive the right to object to the fee 
application. 
 
Second, the district court's finding that the settlement 
conferred benefits on CBS is immaterial as we assume that 
that finding was correct and thus we are not concerned 
with whether it was clearly erroneous. Finally, Rand's 
alleged failure to object to the lodestar and the court's 
determination of it are not germane to our disposition of 
this appeal as Mogell is not entitled to any attorney's fees 
at all. 
 
What, then, is the question the answer to which controls 
the outcome of this appeal? The question is quite 
uncomplicated. What we must determine is whether CBS 
obtained any benefit from the institution and settlement of 
the derivative litigation. We derive this formulation of the 
issue from Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395, 
90 S.Ct. 616, 627 (1970), in which, after recognizing that 
attorney's fees historically have been awarded from 
financial recoveries, the Court indicated that "an increasing 
number of lower courts have acknowledged that a 
corporation may receive a `substantial benefit' from a 
derivative suit, justifying an award of counsel fees, 
regardless of whether the benefit is pecuniary in nature." 
The viability of the Mills standard is demonstrated by the 
recent case of Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 
1999), in which, after noting that an attorney's fee could be 
awarded from a fund created by litigation, the court 
continued on and, citing and quoting Mills, indicated that 
"[i]t is by now also well established that an award of 
counsel fees is only justified where the derivative action 
results in a substantial non-monetary benefit to the 
corporation." See also Crasto v. Estate of Kasel, 63 F.R.D. 
25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Plaintiffs cite no authority, nor 
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have we found any, extending the `substantial benefit' rule 
to cases in which the benefit conferred was not 
accomplished by the culmination of successful litigation."). 
 
Frequently when a corporation receives a substantial 
benefit from the settlement of derivative litigation it will be 
obvious that the settlement is also a benefit attributable to 
the institution of the litigation itself and thus a court 
reviewing the settlement need not focus on the question of 
whether the litigation benefitted the corporation. 
Consequently, there seems to be a paucity of precedent 
dealing with the distinction between institution and 
settlement of litigation for purposes of defining what is a 
benefit to the corporation. But see Joy Mfg. Corp. v. 
Pullman-Peabody Co., 729 F. Supp. 449, 453 (W.D. Pa. 
1989) ("[W]here [a] party has by his or her effort and 
expense through litigation created a benefit for others a fee 
award is appropriate whether or not the litigation is mooted 
before judgment and regardless of whether there is a 
monetary fund created from which fees may be paid.").2 We 
do find, however, a useful analogy to the situation here, in 
which, as will be seen the derivative litigation did not 
benefit CBS, in fee shifting statutes providing for the 
allowance of fees to a "prevailing party." In those cases, to 
recover a fee a plaintiff must demonstrate that he obtained 
"some relief on the merits of his claim,""some of the benefit 
sought" in the action, or "relief on a significant claim in the 
litigation." Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. 
Dep't of Health & Human Res., 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840 
(2001); Watson, 207 F.3d at 224; Holmes , 205 F.3d at 593. 
It seems to us that the principle recognized in those cases, 
though based on statutes, should be applied in the 
nonstatutory context here. A plaintiff should not receive a 
fee in derivative litigation unless the corporation, by 
judgment or settlement, receives some of the benefit sought 
in the litigation or obtains relief on a significant claim in 
the litigation. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann , 223 A.2d 
384, 387 (Del. 1966) ("[T]he rule [allowing attorney's fees] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We are not concerned in the context of this case with the possible 
impact of Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health 
& Human Resources, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (2001), on the proposition for which 
we cite Joy. 
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requires that not only must the action confer some benefit 
upon the corporation, but, also, that the action, when filed, 
was meritorious and had a casual connection to the 
conferred benefit."); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 
395 A.2d 375, 379 (Del. Ch. 1978), aff 'd, 413 A.2d 876 
(Del. 1980). 
 
It is, of course, obvious that the derivative litigation did 
not confer any benefit on CBS and the district court never 
held that it did. In his brief, though Mogell argues 
vigorously, and we will assume correctly, that CBS received 
a benefit from the derivative litigation settlement, he makes 
no contention that CBS is better off because of the 
institution and settlement of the derivative litigation than it 
would have been if the litigation had not been brought in 
the first place. 
 
In fact, the derivative litigation plainly proved to be a 
detriment to CBS because it was an impediment to the 
settlement of the class action. We reiterate that Mogell's 
brief may be read with the greatest care from cover to cover 
but the reader will find nothing in it explaining how CBS 
benefitted from the institution and settlement of the 
derivative litigation as contrasted with the mere settlement 
of the litigation. Moreover, when we repeatedly asked 
Mogell's attorney at oral argument how the derivative 
litigation benefitted CBS he never could answer the 
question. Indeed, he did not even make an argument that 
unless the derivative litigation had been brought the class 
action could not have been settled in 1998 because of a 
concern that derivative litigation arising out of the alleged 
wrongdoing could have been brought later.3  Of course 
Mogell had the burden in the district court to show that the 
derivative litigation conferred a benefit on CBS and he 
simply did not meet this burden. In fact, he never even 
tried to do so as he merely contended in his application for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Obviously it would have been a complete speculation as to whether 
such litigation would have been brought which, in any event, probably 
would have been time barred, at least in part. Moreover, for purposes of 
an award of attorney's fees, a benefit from the litigation cannot be based 
on fanciful, speculative theories. See Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 
537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957). 
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approval of the settlement, as the district court found, that 
CBS received a benefit because the derivative litigation was 
settled and the settlement made the class action settlement 
possible. 
 
We have not overlooked the circumstance that CBS 
received a cash payment of $250,000 from the derivative 
litigation settlement and we recognize the obvious, i.e., the 
receipt of cash can be a benefit. But in this case Mogell 
does not argue that because of the cash settlement CBS 
made a net financial gain on account of the institution of 
the derivative litigation. Plainly, it did not. While there is 
nothing in the record that permits us to make any findings 
as to what CBS's attorney's fees were in the derivative 
litigation, we note that Mogell's attorneys' lodestar 
computation for their services was $1,456,108.60. In the 
circumstances, it is not conceivable that CBS's attorney's 
fees did not exceed $250,000.4 Consequently, CBS certainly 
did not obtain a direct financial benefit from the derivative 
litigation. Thus, inasmuch as CBS derived no other benefit 
from the derivative litigation we must reverse the award of 
attorney's fees. 
 
We realize that the result we reach may complicate the 
settlement of complex corporate litigation.5 Nevertheless, 
sound principles require that we reach it. Mogell alleges 
that the officers and directors caused CBS enormous losses 
but in the end he was willing to settle the case for 
$250,000 being paid to CBS and the opportunity to apply 
for an attorney's fee of three times that amount. In this 
case the tail surely wagged the dog. In fact, the derivative 
litigation when ended was being used for nothing more 
than, as Rand accurately states in his brief, a"hold up" as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At oral argument when we inquired of Mogell's attorney whether we 
should remand the case to the district court to determine what fees CBS 
paid in the derivative litigation he said that it was not necessary to do 
so because the fees must have exceeded $250,000. 
 
5. The opinion may have a salutary affect if it discourages attorneys from 
bringing insubstantial derivative litigation as they should recognize that 
they will not in the end be able to terminate the case with a stipulation 
of dismissal on the basis of their fees being paid unless the corporation 
somehow benefitted from the litigation. 
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it stood in the way of the class action settlement. Overall, 
it is clear beyond doubt that the derivative litigation in itself 
did not yield a benefit to CBS. 
 
We close our discussion by pointing out that we live in a 
real world and thus anticipate that attorneys may seek to 
circumvent the effect of this opinion by constructing 
elaborate frameworks within which fee applications will be 
included. Accordingly, the district courts must review 
settlements in derivative litigation in which attorney's fees 
will be sought with great care to ensure that a fee is not 
assessed against a corporation following the settlement of 
derivative litigation unless the corporation has received a 
substantial benefit from the litigation itself and not simply 
from its settlement. After all, when derivative litigation is 
terminated a corporation always can be said to have 
obtained a benefit as it will save further legal fees. Of 
course, if the litigation results in a substantial monetary 
recovery by the corporation it should be readily apparent 
that it received a substantial benefit from the litigation. But 
where, as here, the settlement is for what in the context of 
the case is a nominal amount not even exceeding the 
corporation's legal expenses in the litigation, the fees 




For the foregoing reasons, the order entered October 19, 
2000, will be reversed and the matter will be remanded to 
the district court for the purpose of entering an order 
denying Mogell's application for fees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do not suggest that the mere fact that a recovery exceeds the 
corporation's direct legal fees means that the corporation benefitted from 
the litigation, for the corporation may have had other expenses 
attributable to the litigation and its participation in the litigation may 
have diverted its officers and employees from other corporate functions. 
Of course, even if it can be said that the corporation benefitted from the 
litigation, a court in the exercise of its discretion might deny fees on a 
theory that the benefit was contrived to support a fee application. A 
question of whether the benefit is contrived is particularly likely to 
arise 
when the plaintiff asserts that the corporation received a substantial 
nonmonetary benefit in a settled case. 
 
                                13 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                14 
 
